New representative survey data for Harare, Zimbabwe are used to analyze the conditions under which informal businesses encounter requests for bribes. A simple model develops basic expectations of bribe exposure: those with higher opportunity costs of formalizing and with a higher ability to pay (resources) are expected to face a higher bribe risk. Empirical results find that informal businesses operating out of necessity are likelier to have a bribe demanded of them. Robustness checks are performed to account for the endogeneity of the main regressors, through a bivariate probit specification, using an instrumental variable of whether an informal business owner started in the area of activity before the country's 2009 dollarization. Limited significant results are found for the effect of revenues (ability to pay).
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(2)
I. Introduction
In many economies, informality predominates: it provides an undeniably large source of employment as well as economic activity. While a formal definition of informality can be hard to come by, it is useful to distinguish between informal employment and those businesses that operate informally. Informal employment can be defined as simply as work that is not covered by labor taxes and public pension contributions. These jobs are almost certainly off-the-books but can exist in either formal or informal firms. Somewhat apart, informal sector businesses operate outside of the official channels by which formalized firms are registered, engage the legal system, pay taxes, and deal with government officials. These businesses largely consist of self-employed operators, who occasionally employ others, who are almost invariably informally employed. On its face, then, operating informally can expose these businesses to frequent (but unstructured) encounters with police and government officials. In some cases, these interactions leave informal businesses exposed to harassment and demands for bribes. Yet while there are substantial literatures on both informality and corruption, there are few attempts to join the two, particularly using micro-level data.
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One reason for this gap in the literature is a lack of adequate data sources. Those data that are commonly available rely on household-level measurement, and in turn, focus on labor dynamics between formal and informal employment. However, households do not necessarily encounter bribery the same way that businesses do, even if those businesses are operated out of the home. This paper leverages unique, survey data on informal sector businesses in Harare, Zimbabwe, collected in 2017. These data were collected using a geographically based, adaptive sampling approach and can be considered representative. Observations are, by construction, centered on informal businesses, a fact which makes the data well-suited to assess under what conditions those activities are exposed to extractions of bribes and harassment at the hands of public officials. This is likely important when assessing the informal sector's exposure to corruption: operators of informal businesses may directly face a demand for a bribe so that they can avoid a fine or being shut down. By contrast, the bribe exposure associated with off-the-books labor is, on its face, more likely to be borne by the tax-evading employer rather than the informal employee.
While the existing literature on informal businesses' exposure to bribery shows that business 3 characteristics often matter, a clear framework is lacking. A first contribution of this paper is such a framework, albeit a simple one. A second contribution is to provide evidence using a representative and business-level data set; these survey-based data use a novel sampling approach, affording indepth, micro-level information on informal businesses, which are often absent from such firm-level data sets. A third contribution is to provide empirical results of this exposure. Specifically, results
show that informal-sector operators with a higher opportunity cost of formalizing are more exposed to an extortion of a bribe; a business's ability to pay is found to have a limited effect. Two measures of the opportunity cost of formalizing are used. First is a measure of whether the informal business owner started the activity due to a lack of other income (NECESSITY); since this measure is selfreported and opinion-based, an alternative measure is used. A second measure is if any member of the owner's household has employment under a contract (NOWAGE). Positive and significant results for NECESSITY and NOWAGE are largely robust to methods adjusting for the potential endogeneity of the regressors. These methods leverage instruments of whether the owner started in the sector of activity before or after the 2009 dollarization of Zimbabwe's economy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes the literature on informality and corruption, section III discusses the background of these issues in Zimbabwe specifically. Section IV presents a stylized model. Section V describes the data used, and section VI gives the main econometric specification. Section VII includes the main results, and VIII concludes.
II. Literature on Informality and Corruption

Informality
A broad literature discusses the informal sector as a driving sector of economic activity and employment. While this stylized fact remains largely undisputed, the characterization of the sector itself is a matter of debate, particularly over the nature of informal employment. A first view is that informality's prominence is a result of market segmentation. From this perspective, informality results from mostly insurmountable barriers to formal employment 4 or to starting a business (De Soto, 1989) . In this sense, informality is not a free and willful decision, but a reflection of necessity (4) due to a lack of viable opportunities in the formal sector. For those in this camp, informality represents a wealth of untapped and under-utilized resources, due to an inefficiently segmented market.
A second view is that informality is an informed decision, undertaken for the avoidance of taxes, fees, and regulations by operating outside of official channels. From this viewpoint, informality presents a means to evade costs, and so it provides marginal benefits to employees and entrepreneurs who would be unable (or unwilling) to conduct business formally. These informal operators will be less likely to formalize if the benefits from formalizing are minimal (as in the case of a low-productive formal sector or low expected payoffs to formality), and so the choice of informality may reflect a lack of enticing opportunities in the formal sector (Maloney, 2004) . This second view is consistent with informality as an operational or individual choice. This choice implies some level of fluidity, and thus informality can serve as a safety net (Loazya and Rigolini, 2011) or last resort (Günther and Launov, 2012) in times of economic duress.
More recent work, along with more available household-level data, has shown the importance of the heterogeneity of the informal sector (Cunningham and Maloney, 2001; Günther and Launov, 2012; Nguimkeu, 2014) . Maloney (1999) , for instance, finds that self-employed, informal business operators are likely differentiated from those working informally; they are more akin to entrepreneurs at the margin of the formal market and may represent a top "tier". This is especially true if returns to formal employment are particularly low relative to the off-the-books income from operating informally (e.g. as shown by Falco and Haywood (2016) in Ghana). Various types of entrepreneurs may be operating in the informal sector, demanding similar heterogeneity among informal sector businesses (Amin, 2009) . Businesses in the informal sector may also have varying levels of output, rely on differing levels of human capital, and use public resources differently.
This heterogeneity can exist even within closely defined areas or neighborhoods. Indeed, informality tends to be highly clustered, even within urban areas. A recent World Bank study using city-based data for Kampala from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics found that the vast majority of informal business activity was centered around three locations near the central business district, and that 84% of informal businesses sold to customers thought to be within a 30-minute walk to their business (World Bank, 2018) . Informal businesses may also be differentiated by household-level factors. Unsurprisingly, members of poorer households tend toward informality. At least some
evidence from Nairobi suggests that informal business operators from poorer households also have lower performance (Gulyani and Talukdar, 2010) .
Corruption and informality
A separate literature has also leveraged micro-level data to analyze the heterogenous determinants and effects of corruption. Overall, corruption is expected to flourish in the absence of good governance and to be ultimately distortionary (see, for instance, Schleifer and Vishny, 1993).
Nonetheless, there is less agreement under what circumstances firms must pay bribes, and the mirror image of when officials demand those informal payments. Some analyses have found that rather than 'grease' transactions, bribes are extracted by officials who 'sand the wheels' of the provision of public services, and thus use delays to extract rents from firms (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999) . In fact, such a delay-to-extract mechanism has been shown to operate across several types of transactions (Freund et al, 2016) . These models can be loosely grouped under a category of "bureaucrat as gatekeeper", where firms actively seek a government service, such as a license or permit, and are thus exposed under certain conditions to a request for a bribe. Less frequently analyzed is the possibility that a corrupt government official will actively seek out and harass firms to demand a bribe, what may be termed as "bureaucrat as harasser".
5 Marjit et al (2000) propose a framework where such a mechanism could occur in the context of tax auditors harassing tax-paying firms. It is not a far leap to extend such a framework of harassment to extract a bribe to include the informal sector.
While discussions of both informality and corruption, separately, have been substantial, little space has been dedicated to directly linking the two. This is somewhat surprising as informality and corruption are two areas that seem sensibly related. Informal businesses, in all but the rarest of circumstances, do not pay taxes. These businesses are not inspected nor audited in a conventional sense. They do not obtain licenses or permits. If they do engage services-such as financial intermediation-it is under their own personal auspices. It is, thus, reasonable to expect informal businesses to be exposed to bribe seekers outside of the official channels where their formal-sector counterparts face bribe requests. Yet nearly no studies- Lavallée and Roubaud (2018) are an (6) exception-discuss the direct experience of informal businesses dealing with bribery in these situations.
Most existing work focuses on the interplay of the informal sector and the prevalence of corruption. In a large cross-section of countries, Besley and Persson (2014) find that where the size of the informal sector is larger, the associated share of tax revenues is also often lower. Smaller tax coffers limit the money available for funding public administration and, thus, cut the money available for public servant salaries. The link between reduced public salaries and corruption is both selfevident and well-forged (see Besley and McLaren, 1993 , for a discussion and more recently Olken and Pande, 2012). Choi and Thum (2005) develop a model where entrepreneurs move to the shadow economy to avoid the extraction of bribes by public officials. In their model, corruption (at the point of business registration) is a barrier to formal entry. They also consider corruption as depleting funding to and provision of public services; in both ways, informality is freely chosen relative to the cost of entry and expected payoffs from greater public good access. As such, graft is self-limiting: greater corruption drives firms underground, which in turn, reduces the number of firms from which a rent can be extracted. Counter to this prediction, some analyses, such as Buehn and Schneider (2009) using multi-country data, find that higher levels of corruption and activity in the "shadow economy" are complementary. Dutta et al (2011) provide similar complementarities between informality and corruption levels in 20 states in India. Emerson (2006) adds a similar model, framing corruption as reducing competition in the informal sector by relegating businesses to informality, providing suggestive cross-country evidence of this relationship.
Most of the preceding analyses model or assume that corruption is largely only faced by firms in the formal sector, or by extension, firms seeking to formalize. They can be grouped in the category of "bureaucrat as gatekeeper". However, the informal sector is also likely exposed to corrupt officials, and such interactions can be considered functionally different than in the formal sector. Businesses in the informal sector often lack redress if they are harassed for a bribe and, in a mirror image, corrupt public officials are likely to encounter less punishment if they harass informal businesses for payoffs.
Alternatively, informal businesses can operate sporadically, over multiple locations and times, and are often less visible, allowing them to avoid interactions with corrupt officials. Waller et al. (2002) and Echazu and Bose (2008) Empirical evidence on the informal sector's exposure to bribery is also lacking. The number of studies using micro-level data to study corruption remains limited, and the share incorporating the informal sector is smaller still. While not using data on the informal sector directly, Safavian et al. (2001) study microenterprises and corruption in the Russian Federation and find that larger firms are more likely to report constraints due to corruption. Svensson (2003) controls for firms in Uganda paying taxes (a proxy for formality), finding that those that do are more likely to encounter a bribe request. Rand and Tarp (2012) use data for Vietnam and include a sub-set of un-registered businesses in their analysis of bribery incidence, which is found to be lower among informal businesses: they speculate that this lower probability is due to the less visibility. A reading of the literature yields few studies using micro-data for informality and bribery in Sub-Saharan Africa, specifically. Lavallée and Roubaud (2018) Porta and Shleifer, 2014 ). Yet study after study has found an overlap in the distributions of measures of revenues and labor productivity, indicating that parts of both sectors are operating at the same points in these distributions.
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While not definitive by any means, such over-lapping distributions suggest that some portion of the informal sector is operating more freely out of choice (perhaps avoiding a costly process of formalizing into a still-low-productive formal sector). The data for
Harare's informal and formal sectors fit this pattern. Figure 3 shows kernel densities of the log of labor productivity (in USD) for both formal and informal businesses. Since the values for informal businesses are recorded as of the last completed month, this value is multiplied by 12.
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Values for the formal sector are calculated from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys.
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Figure 3: The Relative Productivity of Harare's Informal and Formal Sectors
Formal and informal sectors may vary in terms of the sectoral composition, which may account for the differences shown in Figure 3 . Labor Productivity, Sales per Worker (log)
( 11) the formal sector in Harare undertakes these same activities. The city's formal establishments tend to be involved in non-food retail. To test if these sector composition effects are driving the observed productivity differences, survey-weighted regressions accounting for these sector fixed effects were also run. OLS and quantile regression results confirm that on average, informal sector businesses are 88% or 86% less productive, respectively. Harare itself fares poorly within the country: the 2017 ES report that, at 19%, the rate of formal firms encountering at least one bribe request is the highest in the capital (World Bank, 2016) .
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A brief look at news articles from the first six months of 2017 provides anecdotal flavor to these data.
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In the first half of the year, the economy was stagnant, facing widespread cash shortages, as a result of government-introduced bond notes pegged to the US dollar the previous year. 14 Subsequently cited news articles are based on a Factiva search of ("Harare" OR "Zimbabwe") AND ("BRIBE" OR "CORRUPTION"), October 2018. 15 Note that by the end of 2017 the economy again had entered all-out crisis, including the ouster of President Robert Mugabe on November 19.
( 12) skimmed charges from security guards.
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One particular locus of frequent, petty corruption allegations was the city's police force. At the time, the city's informal vendors complained to the city council about harassment and demands for bribes from municipal police officers.
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Several reports of incidents involving physical clashes between vendors and police officers were reported, particularly as the officers attempted to remove vendors from the city's central business district.
Over a similar time period, the informal sector remained pervasive. Vendors and street sellers were known to operate in various areas and times of the day. Though in some arrangements police and officials allowed vendors to continue operating unimpeded, 18 informal businesses remained vulnerable. The treatment of these informal businesses resulted in protests under the Mugabe government: their complaints were not limited to harassment but also extended to a need for infrastructure, such as public-access toilets and water, used frequently by vendors.
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IV. A Simple Model: A Business and a Bureaucrat
An informal business
A simple model can help frame the two literatures on informality and corruption. While not the main contribution of this paper, such a framework does have the benefit of combining two literatures to give tractable predictions of which types of informal businesses face a bribe request.
Such a framework is largely missing in the literature. Those-such as Emerson (2006) -which do combine these two do not focus on the exposure of the informal sector to bribes, or they do not consider differential effects within the informal sector, e.g. Echazu and Bose (2008) . The model here assumes a bribe structure of rent-seeking interactions between informal businesses and public officials: that is, the extraction of a bribe outside of official channels and under the threat of repercussion for operating informally ("bureaucrat as harasser"). ( 13) appears reasonable: based on a representative estimate from the survey (described later), 81% of Harare's informal businesses are either self-operators or employed only unpaid labor in the last month. All goods markets are competitive, and informal businesses are price-takers; revenues are given by .
Informal businesses face a probability of detection by public officials . Assume that a certain share of public officials are corrupt, and these will demand a bribe payment to allow informal businesses to continue operating; for the sake of simplicity, honest public officials 1 are indifferent to informal activity and let business continue without a fine or loss-inducing interruption.
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Such bribes are encountered by unregistered businesses, and so this particular bribe exposure is 0 for formal firms. An informal business's profit is given by: , where is a marginal cost and the same for both informal and formal sectors. Informal businesses face an exogenous likelihood of exit κ, -like Melitz (2003)-which can be considered to encapsulate a sector-specific discount rate. As such, the expected value of an informal business's remaining in operation is . The super-script indicates informal-sector businesses, differentiated from formal firms, . This follows Ulyssea (2018) and subsumes sector-specific discount rates into , 22 which can also represent an exogenous risk term for remaining informal.
represents formalizing costs; its counterpart is the cost of de-formalizing for formal firms. Entry costs ( ) to the formal sector can include every-period fees to formalize and taxes.
Bribes demanded by gatekeepers (for instance, to receive an operating license or construction permit)
can also be regarded as entry costs. So, too, this will include associated costs, such as the time and information needed to register (McKenzie and Sakho, 2010) . These costs are, thus, foregone by businesses that remain informal. De-formalizing costs , by contrast, represent an incurrence for those continuing in the informal sector. These costs include such things as an inability to hire additional workers for risk of being detected (Ulyssea, 2018) or unrealized payoffs to human capital (Rausch, 1991) . Varying both costs by individual characteristics (i.e. , ) introduces business-level heterogeneity.
21 Of course, the honest official's actions can be modeled to include a fine or shut-down action , which would represent a cost of 1 . 22 Ulyssea (2018) explicitly normalizes discount rates to 1 but notes that this term can be considered as a sector-specific discount term. (14) An informal business faces a two-sided exit decision. They will cease business altogether if expected, discounted future profits fall below 0 (assuming no asset resale value), that is if 0.
Alternatively, they will formalize if the cost of operating informally exceeds the expected returns of operating formally, net of entry costs. A business will remain informal therefore if:
. Re-arranging this equation in terms of present informal profits gives:
θB
The right-hand side of this equation represents a net opportunity cost of remaining informal, denoted
, and so the condition to remain informal is:
Where 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0. Put more plainly, the opportunity cost of remaining informal increases with (foregone) formal-sector profits by remaining informal. also increases with a rising risk factor of informality ( ) or with higher de-formalizing costs ( ). By contrast, this opportunity cost decreases with a higher risk factor in the formal sector ( ) or with greater associated entry costs to formalize ( ).
As noted above, informal businesses are frequently highly clustered, and this may partially be due to localized factors. It is helpful, then, to consider informal business profits expressed relative to discrete areas-roughly thought of as neighborhoods (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997) . Informal business profits (in area ) can be expressed as an average neighborhood-based term plus a businessspecific term , giving . The profit distribution is a random term, with locationbased endowments, such as infrastructure or foot traffic, pre-determined and exogenous to each informal business. It is easy to see, then, that an informal business's decision to remain informal becomes . The informal business's location decision, therefore, becomes a relative expression of relative to all other locations 1 … 1. This makes intuitive sense: an informal business will remain in business and in the same location if the costs of remaining informal in the same area are comparatively low to those elsewhere.
The bureaucrat
Corrupt public officials will demand a bribe, , from a set of businesses, a sub-set of , the total number of informal businesses. The total take for a corrupt official is just . Officials are assumed to be segmented, and they thus deal with either the formal or informal sector, as the two operate in a legally distinct way. An official encountering informal businesses can no longer demand bribes from those formalized businesses, as their credible threat is punishment for operating without registration. This is consistent with, for example, horizontal separation models (Echazu and Bose, 2008) . Corrupt officials face a probability of detection by (honest) supervisors, and a complementary probability of impunity, ∈ 0,1 . If corrupt activity is discovered, an official is fired. Informal businesses lack legal redress; is therefore a decreasing function of (but not ). Put differently, corrupt officials face a higher likelihood of detection and dismissal if they extract more bribes, but not necessarily if they extract higher ones.
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An official's time is finite, and dereliction of duties will also result in eventual detection and dismissal: an official using all their time to solicit bribes will be found out and removed. Therefore, the time to extract bribes is a function of the concentration of informality, and increases with .
There is a threshold level of impunity, * , below which a corrupt officer will be fired with certainty. Note, then, that a corrupt official's bribe take in area is bounded, such that , *
. Similarly, the amount of the bribe extracted, | , cannot exceed .
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Bribes exceeding this amount will cause informal businesses to exit the local market and, in turn, reduce the pool of potential bribe payers. In this way, bribe extraction is mitigated by the option to formalize or to cease business altogether; the model, thus complements others such as Choi and Thum (2005) . A corrupt official maximizes their bribe take, such that:
An individual, informal business's likelihood of facing a bribe is straightforwardly expressed as / and a function of max .
Note that this yields a few, basic expectations. First, bribe extraction will increase with a business's revenues-that is, bribery tracks with a business's ability to pay (e.g. Kaufmann and Wei, 1999) . Secondly, the greater the cost to formalize, so too, the increase in bribes. That is, if a business operator has opportunities outside informality, they will have little incentive to deal with corrupt officials. The associated costs also vary by location, as opportunity costs are likely to be localized. So, too, the likelihood of detection by a corrupt official will, of course, increase the chances of facing a bribe, but this is also contingent on the tolerance for corruption and local circumstances.
V. Data: Collection and Methodology
One limitation to studying informal sector businesses is that reliable data are sparse. By most operating definitions, informal businesses remain outside the bounds of many data sources. Informal businesses do not appear on business registries nor other administrative data. Adequate sampling frames for a robust survey methodology are, thus, nearly impossible to come by. Methods linked to household and labor-force surveys (for instance, what is known as the 1-2-3 method) have offered more systematic measurement of informal business activity (such as the data used by Lavallée and Roubaud, 2018) , however such data are based on initial sampling designed to be representative of residential enumeration areas, and ultimately households. These methods are implemented over multiple waves and are thus much more expensive and can lack a depth of information.
The analysis here uses a data set that was developed by the World Bank, which implemented a survey in Harare, Zimbabwe over April-May 2017. The survey methodology uses a method called "adaptive cluster sampling", with stratification (SACS), which was developed in bio-statistics (Thompson 1990 (Thompson , 1991 to efficiently measure elusive and clustered populations: the former characteristic being mostly self-evident and the latter-that informality tends to be highly clusteredbeing well-established in the literature (see, e.g., World Bank 2018 , Harris, 2014 , Gulyani and Talukdar, 2010 .
SACS is implemented through the selection of primary sampling units (PSUs) of square-block areas. In the case of the Harare survey, the administrative area of the city was divided into 200-by-200-meter squares, stratified by the classification of informal business activity (low, medium, high), with a simple random sample of PSUs in a fourth stratum made up of known markets. The idea of SACS is that the discovery of some target units (i.e., informal businesses) is useful and can make fieldwork more efficient. Implementers set a threshold for expansion, where enumerators will move which can be given survey weights and considered as geographically representative (Appendix A.1). This method requires many informal businesses to be enumerated, so many that a lengthy (termed here as "long-form") survey would be prohibitively costly and timely. As a result, a sub-set of businesses were selected randomly for a "longform" interview. In total, 3,687 businesses were enumerated in 129 networks 27 and a total of 515 long-form surveys were completed (see Aga et al, 2017 for a full explanation of implementation).
VI. Econometric Specifications & Descriptive Statistics
Main Econometric Specification
The basic econometric specification uses a probit estimate of bribery, which follows from Eq. 3:
is a latent variable for the binary outcome of interest, Y. The main outcome measure is BRIBE, which records if an informal business reports having to pay a bribe to remain informal.
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This measure uses a 'vague present' time reference and is not linked to the "last completed month" as are several other variables. Such a direct measure of bribery may be unreliable if respondents are reticent to admit having to pay a bribe (e.g. Kraay and Murrell, 2016) , as a result a "yes" value to BRIBE is likely a lower bound.
The log of the last month's sales ( ) is the main measure of having resources to pay. The data include a monthly measure of revenues, as without formal accounting, businesses' recall of the last month's sales is considered reliable and readily available in respondents' minds. is a measure of the opportunity cost of staying informal, though clearly difficult to measure. The survey instrument 25 Note that ACS with or without stratification can implement various types of expansion rules, including to squares on the cardinal (N,S,E,W) axes or diagonals. 26 In the literature on ACS, "network" is defined to mean all contiguous squares meeting or exceeding the threshold. Networks may be bordered by adjacent "edge units" where informal businesses may be encountered. While such accommodations were used in data collection, for the sake of not introducing further confusion, "network" is used here to include all squares enumerated from the selection of the same initial PSU. 27 The actual number of networks enumerated was higher as there were some non-unit networks. 28 The exact wording of questions is presented in Appendix A.II.
includes a wide array of information, and so various measures are possible. Two variables are used separately. The first is a measure of whether an informal business was started because the owner was unable to find another source of income, NECESSITY; this could be a direct opportunity cost of informality, however it is self-reported and relies upon an assessment of a counter-factual (the owner could not find another source of income). The NECESSITY measure is also likely downstream of other facets of each individual's situation, and this assessment is likely endogenous with other unobserved characteristics (for example, reticence). A second proxy measure, NOWAGE, is a dummy variable for whether any other household member of the operator has a job under contract.
An additional vector of controls is given by ′. These include business-level controls ′ .
There is little uniformity in the literature on firm-level bribery exposure, and so these most closely follow Lavallée and Roubaud (2018) . The controls include dummies of the education level (completed or not) of the largest owner, including one dummy for 'no or primary education' and another dummy for 'greater than secondary education'. 'Some or completed secondary education' is the reference category. These controls follow previous studies and are also called for by theoretical models (e.g. Rausch, 1991) noting that greater human capital increases the likelihood of exiting the informal sector. The (log) of the age of the owner is also included, as is a dummy (taking the value of 1 if yes) if the operator is female, as gender may affect alternate opportunities and previous studies have shown that females may be less likely to face a bribe request.
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The controls also include the (log) number of employees (whether paid or unpaid) in the last month, as size may be an indicator of ability to pay (as in Svensson (2003)) or affect the likelihood of detection (Fortin et al, 1997) .
Other factors possibly affecting the likelihood of detection include the type of premises of the informal business. It is unclear if such information has been available in previous studies; here, these controls are included as they are presumed to affect visibility and are thus likely to be correlated with the error term , justifying their inclusion. The estimations include dummies for the type of location, specifically if it is a temporary (but fixed) structure, a household, or no fixed structure (hawker). These are included in ∑ ′ , with the reference category for all regressions being a dummy measure if a business is a hawker.
Still other factors affecting exposure merit inclusion: specifically, the threshold, * cannot be observed, but as the model suggests, is likely to vary by location. As a result, location is conditioned 29 See Lavallée and Roubaud (2018) and Rand and Tarp (2012) . (19) on, including fixed effects by the administrative ward in Harare ′ . This is akin to claiming that the tolerance for corruption can vary by neighborhood, ward, or precinct. As harassment by public officials and police may be a primary mechanism for the extraction of bribes, HARASS is included as a control in later specifications. However, as this certainly introduces simultaneity problems (if harassment is a means of bribery extraction, businesses may be solicited for a bribe because they are harassed or harassed to solicit a bribe), an additional measure is used. This measure averages the harassment experiences of similar businesses-those located nearby-as a proxy for harassment exposure, without including the direct experience of an individual business. Specifically, location data are used to estimate the rate of harassment in the 500-meter radius around each location point, exclusive of those points within 200 meters of each informal business. Other studies on firm-level corruption have used "leave-out" averages, where an average of an inter-sectional stratum (e.g. sizesector-location) is calculated omitting the firm-level input (see, e.g. Freund et al, 2016) ; the measure of harass, called "harass donut", uses GPS data to provide a location-based structure of these measures. As such, it proxies an informal business's exposure to harassment. Lastly, as proximity to fixed premises may vary, controls for the measured location to eight municipal city offices are included. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables and controls; as described above, the data are representative of the Harare administrative area. Nearly one in four informal business operators reports having to pay bribes or give informal gifts to remain un-registered (BRIBE=1). Similarly, roughly one-quarter of the informal sector reports being harassed by police or government officials in the last month; the proxy, 'donut' measure is a lower rate of 10%. The average informal business had between one and two employees in the last month and earned just under $318 in revenue from the business activity.
Descriptive Statistics
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Roughly 40% of informal businesses do not have fixed premises, referred to as "hawkers", this followed by just under 30% with fixed, but temporary premises. Nineteen percent are household-based businesses, which on its face, may appear to be an under-estimate, a concern if enumeration does not adequately reach in-home, informal activity. 32 This compares to a figure of 52% from the ZimStat LFCLS (p. 87). Discrepancies can likely be explained by composition effects (i.e. the LFCLS covers areas outside of Harare), but these values are within confidence ranges. 33 That is, Geographical Information Systems.
( 21) overlay of the concentration of informal businesses. In other words, certain clusters of informality are also clusters of bribe exposure and harassment, while others are not. Table 3 presents baseline, probit results for the two main opportunity-cost variables (NECESSITY and NOWAGE). The odd-numbered columns exclude all controls except for stratum and sector fixed effects as well as sales revenue; even-numbered columns include all co-variates on location type, size, age of the respondent, a dummy for if the owner is a woman, harassment exposure ('donut'), and a location dummy for proximity to a municipal office. All specifications are survey- Note: the difference in predicted values from (mean -.5*SD) to (mean + .5*SD) of (log) monthly sales, an increase of about $483 in sales per month. The difference in harassment exposure is the nearby (donut) harassment rate is (mean -.5*SD) to (mean + .5*SD), or 1% to 20%. Marginal effects produced using margins and mlincom commands in Stata, using vce(unconditional)option as it is survey data.
VII. Results
In line with expectations, there are positive, significant signs for coefficients for NECESSITY and NOWAGE; the marginal effect of the former is a 10% increased likelihood of being exposed to (23) a bribe, and 17% for the latter (from even-numbered columns). The coefficients on sales (i.e., ability to pay) are positive, as expected, but only significant with full controls, and with comparably smaller magnitudes. The marginal effects of an increase in one standard deviation of sales per month (a magnitude of $483) are increases in the likelihood of facing a bribe of 6% and 4% in columns 2 and 4, respectively. The exposure to harassment (the 'donut' measure) is also notable; its coefficient is consistently positive and significant, with marginal effects of 10% in Table 4 . Additionally, those having only a primary education are consistently less likely to face a bribe request.
Measures for dealing with endogeneity of main regressors
A natural endogeneity concern is that the measures of opportunity cost are themselves functionally determined by other measures. This would be the case if, for instance, education level affected the likelihood that an informal business was started out of lack of opportunity elsewhere. As both measures of the opportunity cost are binary, they can be expressed as well with a latent variable form, given by: 
A two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) additionally allows for an estimate of the local average treatment effect (LATE), that is the effect of opportunity cost "treatment" on bribe likelihood for compliers: that is, the effect of a higher opportunity cost for the group 1.
However, 2SLS is generally regarded as inappropriate for binary outcomes with binary, endogenous regressors. Termed the "forbidden regression", this estimate will produce inconsistent and biased estimates, as the linear projection of the regressor from the first stage will not align with the form of the regressor itself (Wooldridge, 2002: 267-8) . However, 2SLS has the advantage of being straightforward, without requiring a further transformation. The procedure also yields substantial information about the appropriateness of the instrument, which is unavailable for procedures for endogenous, binary regressors (Nichols, 2011). Thus, it is often good enough to estimate the average treatment effect by simply using 2SLS, conditional on controls, this is the local average treatment or LATE (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). 2SLS estimates are presented, therefore, alongside probit and biprobit estimates. To understand this point, it is worth revisiting the expression of the opportunity cost of remaining informal, . Consider the risk factors for both operating in the informal and formal sectors, and respectively, recalling that each subsumes a sector-specific discount rate. A clear exogenous shock to such rates presents itself in the form of the postdollarization price stabilization, which would naturally reduce both the risk factors of operating informally and formally. A palatable assumption is that the relative reduction in risk of operating formally would be greater than that of the risk of operating informally. This assumption is intuitive:
exceptionally high-risk-rates during the hyperinflation crisis lead to a near-complete discounting of all future returns, and this immediacy is consistent informality as a safety net. The relative stabilization of the economy would have the effect of movement toward the formal sector after dollarization; this is cursorily consistent with Figure 1 . Note that this also implies that those taking up activities after dollarization do so under less risky circumstances, thus implying that initiating these economic activities is done even more so out of necessity. Thus, a first-stage expectation of taking up an activity post-2009 is that these operators are more likely to be operating out of necessity.
A natural concern of such a measure as an instrument is that the pre-and post-2009 indicator would also affect officials' demands for bribes, violating the exclusion restriction. This would require remarkable persistence in the effect on bribe demand, given that dollarization occurred roughly eight years before the collection of the survey. Even if such an effect does persist, its directional effect is likely in the opposite direction, meaning that the instrument is, if anything, underestimated. Take, for instance, the public funding channel.
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An assumption in the literature is that public officials' demands for bribes will increase in the face of falling wages, which are reduced with shrunken public coffers.
Increasing general revenue, as was the case post-dollarization (Appendix A.VIII), would abate the demand for bribes. In other words, if this effect is sufficiently persistent that it is still affecting bribe 36 Note that as of writing in 2018/19, Zimbabwe's economy has entered into another period of economic crisis, which has continued. The point is, however, that the pitch of these crises was substantially less than those seen in the 2000-09 period. 37 I thank a colleague for this valuable suggestion.
demand eight years after hyperinflation, its result would be to reduce demand relative to pre-2009, just as the effect is that those taking up sector activities are more likely to operate out of need.
The data include a measure of the years of experience of the largest owner in the specific "industry of" activity-that is, for example, in making handicrafts or baking bread. This is a different measure than from the age of the business, or for that matter, from the age of the owner. In fact, the average informal business has been in operation for 4.9 years, while the average owner has been active in that area of activity for 7 years.
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This is suggestive that informal business owners took up their activity outside of a business context or possibly had a previous operation. A concern would be if the measure of industry experience is simply reflecting age, savvy, or longevity in the informal sector, all of which could plausibly be related to bribe exposure (through for example knowledge that paying a bribe has certain known payoffs for continuing to operate or to use savvy to avoid corrupt officials). In this case, it is important to control for age of the owner. For the instrument, a dummy variable is created, taking a value of 1 if the owner started in that "sector" after 2009, 0 otherwise. If this variable is sufficiently, strongly correlated with the measure of opportunity cost and sufficiently exogenous to bribe exposure, it suggests a valid instrument; by contrast this measure would be vulnerable to further endogeneity if there are other unobservables correlated with both the industry experience as well as bribe exposure. Table 5 shows the estimated effects (LATE for 2SLS and ATE for biprobit) from two-stage estimations of the full models from Turning to the results themselves, the effects of both NECESSITY and NOWAGE are positive and significant for the biprobit estimations; though with the caveat that only the rho for NOWAGE is significant, suggesting that an endogenous selection effect requires a two-stage estimate. The ATE then bears some interpretation. This estimate shows that, all else equal, the bribery rate faced by informal operators is 26% greater if no households had a member under contract (NOWAGE=0 for all) compared to the counterfactual where all households included such a steadier income source (NOWAGE=1 for all). The effect among those specifically without a contract income in the household (that is the LATE from 2SLS) shows a magnitude of 52%. Such magnitudes are substantial and have suggestive economic conclusions: that is the lack of an alternate, steady income such as under-contract employment has a notably large and significant effect on the overall incidence of corruption.
Results of Two-Stage Estimations
Appendix V shows the first-and second-stage results for these estimations, where the first stage is a probit estimation of each opportunity cost measure (D). The biprobit estimates for NOWAGE are most appropriate, as discussed above, though all estimates for all measures, including 2SLS and biprobit are given for completeness. The relative "uptake" probabilities implied by Eq. 5
( 28) merit some discussion. First, as a non-weak instrument, the dummy indicating that an owner was active in an activity after 2009 is positive and strongly significant, indicating that all else equal, those taking up activities after stabilization are much more likely to not have an under-contract income in their household. Not surprisingly, those with beyond a secondary education are less likely to have NOWAGE=1, as are those with more employees. Operators with a fixed, but temporary premises (e.g. a market stall) are also less likely to be operating in a situation of few opportunities outside informality.
As mentioned above, the biprobit specification is particularly susceptible to bias from misspecification, including from additional, omitted variables. The rich data from the survey allow for additional co-variates to be included. Table 6 includes several additional controls (in both X' and therefore Z'), replicating results from Table 5 , but including controls for dummies on whether there are children (6 years old or younger) in the owner's household, a dummy for whether the owner is the primary income earner, a dummy for the marital status of the owner, a dummy if the business uses public services (in the form of use of the electrical grid), and a dummy variable for whether the business was enumerated in an isolated residential area (i.e. no industrial or retail area within 500m).
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With these additional controls, for NOWAGE, the 2SLS estimates are sufficiently identified with non-weak instruments, and the biprobit estimates are bivariate normal with evidence that a two-stage correction is needed; for NECESSITY, though is significant (and negative), suggesting the appropriateness of the biprobit, the 2SLS fails to reject under-identification (though the instrument is statistically not weak).
(29) 
